Persist Level Parallelism: Streamlining Integrity Tree Updates for Secure Persistent Memory

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Abstract—Emerging non-volatile main memory (NVMM) is rapidly being integrated into computer systems. However, NVMM is vulnerable to potential data remanence and replay attacks. Memory encryption and integrity verification have been introduced to protect against such data integrity attacks. However, they are not compatible with a growing use of NVMM for providing crash recoverable persistent memory. Recent works on secure NVMM pointed out the need for data and its metadata, including the counter, the message authentication code (MAC), and the Bonsai Merkle Tree (BMT) to be persisted atomically. However, memory persistency models have been overlooked for secure NVMM, which is essential for crash recoverability.

In this work, we analyze the invariants that need to be ensured in order to support crash recovery for secure NVMM. We highlight that by not adhering to these invariants, prior research has substantially underestimated the cost of BMT persistence. We propose several optimization techniques to reduce the overhead of atomically persisting updates to BMTs. The optimizations proposed explore the use of pipelining, out-of-order updates, and update coalescing while conforming to strict or epoch persistency models, respectively. We evaluate our work and show that our proposed optimizations significantly reduce the performance overhead of secure crash-recoverable NVMM from 720% to just 20%.

Index Terms—persistency, security, integrity tree update, persist-level parallelism

I. INTRODUCTION

Non-volatile main memory (NVMM) is coming online, offering non-volatility, good scaling potential, high density, low idle power, and byte addressability. A recent NVMM example is Intel Optane DC Persistent Memory, providing a capacity of 3TB per socket [22]. Due to non-volatility, data may remain in main memory for a very long time even without power, exposing data to potential attackers [8]. Consequently, NVMM requires memory encryption and integrity protection to match the security of DRAM (which we refer to as secure NVMM), or to provide secure enclave environment. Furthermore, it is expected that NVMM may store persistent data that must provide crash recoverability, a property where a system can always recover to a consistent memory state after a crash. Crash recoverability property offers multiple benefits, such as allowing persistent data to be kept in memory data structures instead of in files, and as a fault tolerance technique to reduce checkpointing frequency [1], [14], [23], [24], [48]. Finally, some applications have emerged that need to run on secure enclave and yet require persistency and crash recovery, such as a shadow file system [19].

Crash recovery of data with NVMM is achieved through defining and using memory persistency models. However, there has not been a systematic study examining how secure NVMM can support crash recovery on persistency models. Supporting persistency models on secure NVMM incurs two new requirements: 1) the correct plaintext value of data must be recovered, and 2) data recovery must not trigger integrity verification failure for a given persistency model. To meet these requirements, the central question is what items must persist together, and what persist ordering constraints are there to guarantee the above requirements? No prior studies have provided a complete answer. Liu et al. pointed out that counters, data, and message authentication codes (MACs) must persist atomically [33], but ignored the Merkle Tree for integrity verification. Awad et al. pointed out that Merkle Tree must also be persisted leaf-to-root [4], but did not specify ordering needed for persistency models.

The focus of this work is to comprehensively analyze the persist and persist ordering requirements required for correct crash recovery on secure NVMM. Getting this analysis right is important. Not only does it affect correctness (i.e., whether the above crash recovery requirements are met), but it also affects the accurate performance overheads estimation and the derivation of possible performance optimizations. For example, one property missed by prior work is that leaf-to-root updates of Bonsai Merkle trees (BMT) must follow persist order, otherwise crash recovery may trigger integrity verification failure at system recovery. Obeying this ordering constraint, we found that the overheads of crash recoverable strict persistency (SP) is about 30× slowdown, which is more than one order of magnitude higher than previously reported slowdown.

In this paper, we analyze and derive invariants that are needed to ensure correct crash recovery (i.e., correct plaintext value is recovered and no integrity verification failure is triggered). Then, to reduce the performance overheads, we propose performance optimizations, which we refer to as persist-level parallelism, or PLP, that comply with the invariants for strict and epoch persistency (EP) models. For SP, we found
that pipelining BMT updates is an effective PLP optimization, which brings down the performance overheads from 7.2× to 2.1× when protecting non-stack regions, compared to a secure processor model with write back caches but not supporting any persistency model. We then analyze EP where persist ordering within an epoch is relaxed, but enforced across epochs. Under EP, two more PLP optimizations were enabled besides pipelining: out-of-order BMT update and BMT update coalescing. These two optimizations reduce overheads to 20.2%.

To summarize, the contributions of this paper are:

- To our knowledge, this is the first work that fully analyzes crash recovery correctness for secure NVMM, and formulates crash recovery invariants required under different persistency models.
- For strict persistency, we propose a new optimization for pipelining BMT updates.
- For epoch persistency, we propose two new optimizations: out-of-order BMT updates and BMT update coalescing.
- We point out that, many techniques in prior studies did not completely guarantee crash recovery and hence substantially underestimated its performance overheads.
- An evaluation showing that our proposed PLP optimizations above significantly reduce the performance overhead of secure NVMM.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the background and related work. Section III formulates the invariants to be ensured in order to support crash recovery for secure NVMM. Section IV details four BMT update models, including the baseline used for evaluation and the three proposed ones. Section V discusses our hardware architecture. Section VI presents our experimental methodology. Section VII evaluates our proposed update mechanisms, and Section VIII concludes this work.

II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK

**Threat Model** We assume an adversary who has physical access to the memory system (NVMM and system bus), e.g. through ownership, theft, acquisition after system disposal, etc. Similar to the incidence of recovering sensitive data from improperly disposed used hard drives [41], [58], data remanence in NVMM extends such vulnerabilities to data in memory [8]. In addition, NVMMs are potentially vulnerable to replay attacks [2] and cold boot attacks [20], [37], which allow malicious entities access to the systems. Similar to prior work [3], [4], [30], [31], [47], we assume that the adversary cannot read the content of on-chip resources such as registers and caches, hence the processor chip forms the trust boundary where trusted computing base (TCB) may be located. All off-chip devices, including main memory and memory bus, are considered vulnerable to both passive (snooping) and active (tampering) attacks. These assumptions are essential to secure processor architecture [9], [15], [51], [54], [57], [60], [61].

**Memory Encryption** The goal of memory encryption is to conceal the plaintext of data written to the off-chip main memory [29], [32], [44], [53], [67] or sent to other processor chips [42], [44], [64]. Counter mode encryption [52], [60], [61] is commonly used for this purpose. It works by encrypting a counter to generate a pseudo one time pad (OTP) which is XORed with the plaintext (or ciphertext) to get ciphertext (or plaintext). To be secure, pads cannot be reused, and hence the counter must be incremented after each write back (for temporal uniqueness) and concatenated with address to form a seed (for spatial uniqueness). Counters may be monolithic (as in Intel SGX [12], [18]) or split (as in Yan et al. [60]). Split counter co-locates a per-page major counter and many per-block minor counters on a single cache block, and each cache block is represented by the concatenation of a major and a minor counter. Due to its much lower memory overhead (1.56% vs. 12.5% with monolithic counter [60]), counter cache performance increases and the overall decryption overhead decreases. Hence, we assume the use of a split counter organization for the rest of the paper.

**Memory Integrity Verification** Memory encrypted using counter mode encryption is vulnerable to a counter replay attack which allows the attacker to break the encryption [60], hence memory integrity verification is needed not only to protect data integrity, but also to protect encryption from trivial cryptanalysis [39], [65]. Data fetched from off-chip memory must be decrypted and its integrity verified when it arrives on chip. In multiprocessors, data supplied from other processor chips also need to be verified [42], [44]. Early memory integrity protection relied on Merkle Tree covering the entire memory [16] with on chip tree root. When using counter mode encryption, Rogers et al. proposed Bonsai Merkle Tree (BMT) [43] that employs stateful MACs to protect data, leaving a much smaller and shallower tree covering only counters. A stateful MAC uses data, address, and counter as input to the MAC calculation; any modification to any MAC input or the MAC itself becomes detectable. Since it is sufficient to have one input component with freshness protection, BMT only needs to cover counters. Intel SGX adopted this observation to design a similar stateful MAC approach to construct a counter tree that combines counters and MACs [18].

**Memory Persistency** Memory persistency is defined to allow the reasoning of crash recovery for persistent data [1], [6], [7], [11], [13], [25], [27], [38], [40], [59]. It defines the ordering of stores as seen by a crash recovery observer [35], [38], pertaining when a store persists (i.e. becomes durable) with respect to other stores of the same thread. Since visibility to crash recovery observer and other threads may be intertwined, it is sometimes coupled with memory consistency models.

The most conservative model, strict persistency (SP) requires that persists follow the sequential program order of stores [38]. While providing simple reasoning, SP does not allow any overlapping or reordering of persists, limiting optimization opportunities in the system and incurring high performance overheads. More relaxed persistency models include epoch persistency (EP) and buffered epoch persistency.
(BEP) [38], as well as *lazy persistency* [1]. With EP/BEP, programmers define regions of code that form *epochs* [17], [26]. Persists within an epoch can be reordered and overlapped, but persists across epochs are strictly ordered using persist barriers, which enforce that persists in an older epoch must complete prior to the execution (or completion) of any persist from a younger epoch. On top of a persistency model, crash recovery often requires the programmer to define atomic durable code regions [10], [13], [36], [45], [49], [63].

**WPQ and Metadata Caches** Modern processors utilize a write pending queue (WPQ) in the memory controller (MC) [45]. System features such as Asynchronous DRAM Refresh (ADR) adds WPQ to the persistence domain by requiring that the contents of the WPQ are flushed to NVMM when a crash occurs [45], making WPQ the point of persistence for stores.

Counters, MACs, and Merkle Tree nodes may be placed in the last level cache [43] or in their own metadata caches [16], [43], [50], [51], [60], [61]. Metadata caches may be unified for all metadata types [46], [55] or separate [30], [62]. Our models assume separate metadata caches.

**Secure NVMM for Crash Recovery** Data remanence vulnerability for DRAM as data may persist for weeks under very low temperature [20], [37]. The vulnerability is much worse with NVM since data is retained for years, hence self-encrypting memory has been proposed [8]. However, NVM will likely host persistent data supporting crash recovery, requiring integrating memory encryption and integrity verification with memory persistency. This has been explored only recently. Swami et. al [55] proposed co-locating data, counters, and MAC, to make it easier to atomically persist them together. Liu et al. [33] proposed a similar approach, plus an alternative approach of using the MC as a gathering point for atomic persistence. Awad et al. [4] looked at persisting data, counters, and BMT, but did not address persistency models and persist ordering. Zuo et al. [68] proposed coalescing counters for persisting counter cache data, but did not discuss counter integrity verification. Liu et al [34] optimized backend memory operations (BMO) including encryption, integrity protection, compression, and deduplication and proposed parallelized execution and pre-execution with compiler support to reduce the BMO overhead. Persistency models and persist ordering of BMT updates were not discussed. Finally, in non-NVM context, Saileshwar et. al [47] and Taassori et. al [56] proposed mechanisms to reduce the integrity tree size. However, while shallower, the fundamental bottleneck of having to update BMT from leaf-to-root in persist order remains, which is what is addressed in this paper.

III. **Correctness of Crash Recovery**

Supporting crash recovery requires three levels of mechanisms. At the highest level is the programmer specifying a durable atomic region, which allows a group of stores to persist together or not at all. With Intel PMEM, building such a region needs to rely on creating and keeping undo/redo logging in software. Building such a region requires the next level of mechanism (*persistency model*), which specifies the ordering of the persistence of stores with respect to program order, such as strict persistency, epoch persistency, etc. Each persistency model relies on the next level mechanism which must ensure that each store, if it persists, must be recoverable to its original plaintext value and must not trigger integrity verification failure. It is the last level mechanism that our work seeks to provide.

In this section, we formulate the invariants to be ensured in order to support crash recovery for secure NVMM. The system we assume is one with volatile on-chip caches and a persistent domain that includes NVMM and the WPQ inside the MC. Our analysis focuses on a system with counter-mode memory encryption along with MAC and BMT integrity verification. Counters, MACs, and BMT nodes are cacheable and can be lost with the loss of power, except the BMT root which is always stored persistently on chip. Recovering from a crash requires recomputing the BMT root and validating it against the stored root. We discuss Intel SGX MEE later in the paper.

Suppose that plaintext $P$ at address $A$ is encrypted using counter $γ$ and private key $K$ to yield ciphertext $C$, i.e., $C = E_K(P, A, γ)$ and necessarily the decryption follows $P = D_K(C, A, γ)$. Suppose also that $M$ represents a message authentication code for $C$, i.e., $M = MAC_K(C, A, γ)$. Finally suppose that BMT covers all counters and has a root $R$. We define BMT update path as follows:

**Definition 1:** BMT update path is the path of nodes from a leaf node (i.e., one encryption page) to the root of BMT.

Fig. 1 shows an example with two persists that generate updates to an 8-ary BMT. Update $δ_1$ affects all $\frac{1}{8}$ parts of nodes shown in stripes, while update $δ_2$ affects all $\frac{3}{8}$ parts of nodes shown in grey. The update paths intersect at the BMT root and different parts of it are modified. Note that while all update paths necessarily intersect at the root, they may intersect earlier.

**Definition 2:** Common Ancestors of two persists are nodes in the BMT tree that appear in the BMT update paths of both persists. The *Least Common Ancestor* (LCA) is a common ancestor that is at the lowest-to-leaf level compared to all other common ancestor nodes.

In the example in Fig. 1, the common ancestor consists of only the BMT root, hence the BMT root is also the LCA. However, if another persist causes an update at node $X4-2$, the common ancestor becomes $X3-64$.

![Fig. 1. An example illustrating two BMT updates with their update paths. Persist $δ_1$'s path is shown as striped pattern (X4-1, X3-1, X2-1, X1-1) while $δ_2$'s update path is shown in the grey color (X4-512, X3-64, X2-8, X1-1). Each MAC takes a 64-byte input and outputs a 64b hash value.](image-url)
then this update and $\delta$ share $X_3$ and $X_1$ as common ancestors, with $X_3$-1 being the LCA.

We also define a memory tuple as a collection of items that are needed to crash recover a datum:

**Definition 3:** Secure memory transforms an on-chip plaintext data $P$ at block address $A$ to a memory tuple of $(C, \gamma, M, R)$ when data is persisted to main memory, and vice versa when persisted data is read from main memory.

The memory tuple represents the totality of transformation of a block when it is written back (out of the last level cache or LLC) to off-chip memory, and we claim that each tuple item must be available in order to recover data correctly, and failure to persist any item(s) in the tuple results in a crash recovery problem:

**Invariant 1:** Crash Recovery Tuple Invariant. In a secure memory with counter-mode encryption and MAC/BMT verification, in order to recover a datum $P$ that was persisted in memory, its entire memory tuple $(C, \gamma, M, R)$ must have been persisted as well.

To illustrate this, suppose that a plaintext value $P_o$ is changed to a new value $P'_o$. The memory tuple for the block then must change from $(C_o, \gamma_o, M_o, R_o)$ to $(C_n, \gamma_n, M_n, R_n)$. If some tuple item was not persisted, for example $M_n$, post-crash, $(C_n, \gamma_n, M_o, R_n)$ is recovered. In this case, the correct plaintext is recovered but MAC verification fails because the old MAC($M_o$) fetched from memory mismatches with $MAC_R(C_n, A, \gamma_n)$. If instead $\gamma_n$ was not persisted, since $P_n \neq D_K(C_n, A, \gamma_o)$, the correct plaintext is not recovered. Not only that, since $\gamma_o$ is input to MAC and BMT verification, both verification mechanisms fail as well. Table I lists the outcomes of not persisting one or more of the memory tuple.

Note that the crash tuple invariant (Invariant 1) specifies the necessary and sufficient condition for recovering data post crash. It does not specify exactly "when" tuple items must be persisted with respect to the data persist; this depends on the crash recovery expectation of the program and the persistency model being assumed.

So far we have discussed the crash recovery correctness for a single data persist. To support crash recovery, programmers must reason about not just a single persist, but multiple persists and the relative ordering between them. In this case, we assume that if there is possibility that the crash recovery observer reads the persistent memory state between two persists, then the two persists must be ordered. Now suppose that there are two ordered persistent stores (persists) $\alpha_1$ and $\alpha_2$ to the different blocks. For the memory tuples of these different blocks, it is possible that these blocks may modify the same counter block, the same MAC block, and definitely the same BMT root. If the persist order of memory tuples is not followed, recoverability is problematic. For example, suppose that $\alpha_1 \rightarrow \alpha_2$ but $R_2 \rightarrow R_1$, which means that the BMT root is updated by the second persist before by the first persist. If a crash occurs prior to either of them or after both of them, recoverability is not jeopardized. But at other points, recovery can fail. For example, suppose that a crash occurs after $\alpha_1$ and $R_2$ persist but before $\alpha_2$ and $R_1$ persist. Post crash, BMT verification failure occurs due to the root not reflecting the persist of $\alpha_1$. In other words:

**Invariant 2:** Persist Order Invariant. Suppose that $\alpha_1$ happens before $\alpha_2$ in program order. If the crash recovery observer may read out the persistent state between $\alpha_1$ and $\alpha_2$, then $\alpha_2$ must follow $\alpha_1$ in persist order, i.e. $\alpha_1 \rightarrow \alpha_2$. If $\alpha_1 \rightarrow \alpha_2$ in persist order, then for correct crash recovery, the following must hold: $(C_1, \gamma_1, M_1, R_1) \rightarrow (C_2, \gamma_2, M_2, R_2)$ in persist order, i.e. the persist order of each respective memory tuple items must follow the order of data persists.

Note that the persist order depends on the persistency models. For SP, every persist is ordered with respect to others and Invariant 2 applies to each pair of persists. For EP, Invariant 2 applies only to stores from different epochs. Persists from the same epoch are unordered, which gives a rise to optimization opportunities discussed in Section IV.

**Implications** There are several consequences of Invariant 2. Ordering violation triggers recovery failures as listed in Table II. Current persistency model specifications are incomplete for secure NVMM as they only enforce ordering of data persists (e.g. $C_1 \rightarrow C_2$). Persist barrier (such as $\text{sfence}$) needs to expand its semantics to also include other tuple components.

In addition, mechanisms or optimizations that may reorder tuple updates violate Invariant 2. For example, suppose that $C_2$ is available early (due to prediction); pre-computing $\gamma_2$ or $M_2$ can carry the risk of them being evicted from the metadata cache earlier than $\gamma_1$ or $M_1$, hence violating the invariant. Furthermore, two persists $\alpha_1$ and $\alpha_2$ could incur different latencies to update their respective BMT paths because some BMT nodes may be found on chip while others need to be fetched from main memory. Without an explicit mechanism to enforce the ordering of BMT path updates, Invariant 2 is likely violated often. To our knowledge, our work is the first to identify the need to order BMT (and tuple) updates. Finally, naive mechanisms to enforce persist ordering impose a very high cost that scales with the size of BMT, exposing BMT.
updates as the primary performance bottleneck for a secure NVMM. Upon eviction of a block from LLC, the data, its counter, and MAC are updated and sent to the MC, but they must wait until BMT root is updated before the persist can be considered successful. For example, assuming a hash latency of 80 processor cycles [30], updating a 9-level BMT incurs 720 processor cycles for one persist.

IV. STREAMLINING BMT UPDATES

In this section, we explore how BMT update performance due to persists can be improved. Performance optimization techniques that are possible depend on (1) no violation against invariants discussed in the previous section, and (2) the persistency model that is assumed. We collectively refer to the key methods as persist-level parallelism (PLP): pipelining, out-of-order updates, and coalescing.

A. Strict Persistency

1) Baseline Atomic Persist Mechanism: Following Invariant 1, for each memory update, we need to ensure that all memory tuple components also persist. Due to the write-back cache, the eviction order of dirty blocks may be different from the program order. Therefore, with SP, one way to satisfy the invariant is to atomically persist the tuple generated by each store, which results in write-through cache behavior. To achieve this, we devise a 2-step persist (2SP) mechanism. Similar to [33], 2SP relies on the WPQ of the MC as persist gathering point. 2SP consists of two steps: the first step involves gathering and locking persist memory tuple components in the WPQ (while flagged as incomplete), while the second step flags the completion of the persist and releases tuple components to memory. A persist is marked completed when the WPQ receives its updated ciphertext, updated counter, MAC, and acknowledgement that the BMT root has been updated. Once completed, the blocks are allowed to drain from the WPQ to the NVMM. On power failure, any incomplete flagged blocks are considered not persisted and invalidated. Since the persistence of the counter and MAC is straightforward and not expensive, we will focus the rest of the discussion on the expensive BMT update.

To illustrate the mechanism, suppose that two persists are initiated, as shown in Fig. 1. Fig. 2 shows the sequence of persists of memory tuples due to the two persists, in the baseline persist mechanism. For persist \( \delta_1 \), ciphertext \( C_1 \), counter \( \gamma_1 \), MAC \( M_1 \) are persisted. A new value of counter \( \gamma_1 \) is needed for the BMT update path starting from leaf of BMT \( X4-1 \), which in turn is needed to update BMT node \( X3-1 \), and so on, until BMT root \( X1-1 \) is updated. When ciphertext \( C_1 \), counter \( \gamma_1 \), and MAC \( M_1 \) are completed and BMT root is updated, \( \delta_1 \) is considered completed, after which persist \( \delta_2 \) can commence. It is clear that even though intermediate nodes in the BMT update path do not need to persist (only the leaves and root need to persist), the critical path is due to their sequential updates.

\[
\begin{align*}
M_1 & \quad \delta_1 \text{ persists} \\
Y_1 & \rightarrow X4-1 \rightarrow X3-1 \rightarrow X2-1 \rightarrow X1-1 \\
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
M_2 & \quad \delta_2 \text{ persists} \\
Y_2 & \rightarrow X4-64 \rightarrow X3-8 \rightarrow X2-1 \rightarrow X1-1 \\
\end{align*}
\]

Time

Fig. 2. The timeline of two data persists and their memory tuple persists.

2) PLP Mechanism 1: Pipelining BMT Updates: While the baseline persist mechanism described in Section IV-A1 is correct, it suffers from high overheads. Each node in the BMT update path must wait until the previous node has been calculated. In order to improve this situation, recall that the Persist Order Invariant (Invariant 2) only requires that the BMT root update follows the persist order. This means that it is possible to update BMT nodes out of order, as long as the root is still updated in persist order. This is illustrated in Fig. 3(a), where update paths of persist \( \delta_1 \) and persist \( \delta_2 \) are updated out of order but updates to BMT root are kept in persist order.

While out of order non-root updates are best for performance, it is difficult to avoid write-after-write (WAW) hazards if two persists’ BMT update paths intersect at more than just the BMT root. To avoid WAW without much complexity, we design a more restrictive version of the optimization, namely pipelined BMT update. With a pipelined update, a younger persist is allowed to update a certain level of BMT only when an older persist has completed its update of the same level BMT node. This is illustrated in Fig. 3(b). The pipelined update optimization ensures that if two persists have common ancestor nodes, they will still be updated in persist order.

Note that as the memory grows bigger, the BMT will have more levels and hence more pipeline stages. Thus, one attractive feature of pipelined BMT updates is that with larger memories, the degree of PLP increases and pipelined BMT updates becomes even more effective versus non-pipelined updates.

B. Epoch Persistency

With EP, two persists in the same epochs do not have persist ordering constraints; persists only need to be ordered across separate epochs. This fact allows the write-back cache to reduce the write traffic and also gives us opportunities to optimize BMT updates. We make a stronger assumption on EP compared to that in literature: Nalli et. al [36] assert that 75% of epochs update one 64B cache line, where we assume a minimum of one store per epoch. Specifically, we assume that crash recovery does not depend on the transient persistent state within an epoch while an epoch is executing. Instead,
crash recovery depends only on the persistent state at an epoch boundary. This assumption requires that any actions performed by an epoch that were not completely persisted prior to crash must be re-executable. This assumption is reasonable, because epochs are usually components of a durable transaction, and durable transactions can be re-executed if they fail.

1) PLP Mechanism 2: Out-of-Order BMT Updates: Invariant 2 applies to two persists that are ordered, i.e. in EP, they belong to two different epochs. It does not specify how to treat two persists that are not ordered, such as those belonging to the same epoch. The question then arises whether two unordered persists can be performed out of order (OOO), and if so, to what extent and whether there are any constraints that need to be observed.

Before discussing them further, let us first discuss the potential benefit of OOO. OOO BMT updates have a much better performance potential than (in-order) pipelining for two reasons. First, it can hide the BMT cache miss latency as illustrated in Fig. 4. Fig. 4(a) shows a case where persist δ1 is attempting to update the BMT, but suffers a cache miss on BMT node X-4-1. This introduces bubbles in the in-order BMT update pipeline, and persist δ2 is consequently delayed, therefore it cannot update X-4-64 until X-4-1 is updated. Fig. 4(b) illustrates that with OOO, both updates can occur in parallel, with δ2 not being delayed by the cache miss that δ1 must wait for. Therefore, OOO can achieve a higher degree of PLP compared to in-order pipelining. Second, OOO BMT updates enable us to use pipelined MAC units to improve the throughput. The in-order BMT update pipeline has the same number of stages as the levels in the BMT and there is at most one update at each level. Therefore, the throughput of pipelined BMT is limited to one BMT update per n cycles, where n is the MAC latency. In contrast, with OOO, a BMT update can start at every cycle, thereby increasing the throughput to one BMT update per cycle.

Regarding correctness of OOO execution of persists from the same epoch, a concern arises that there may be a write after write (WAW) hazard in the case where two persists have their BMT update paths intersecting at not just the BMT root. The hierarchical nature of BMT dictates that if two BMT update paths intersect, the intersection representing common ancestors manifests as common suffix in the paths, starting from the lowest common ancestor (LCA) node, and then continuing to the LCA’s parent, grandparent, etc. until the BMT root. Does updating common ancestor nodes out of order trigger a WAW hazard? We assert that they do not.

In order to prove it, we note that different blocks will cause different counters to be updated. Let us denote the old counter values as γ1o and γ2o and the new values as γ1n and γ2n. The counters correspond to either one BMT leaf node (if the counters are co-located in a block) or two BMT leaf nodes (if the counters are not co-located in a block). In the former, the leaf node is the LCA, while in the latter the LCA is further up the tree. Suppose that persist δ1 updates the LCA before δ2. Then, at the end of the LCA update for both persists, the LCA value is MAC(γ1n, γ2n, ...). If instead δ2 updates the LCA before δ1, the LCA value is also MAC(γ1n, γ2n, ...), which is unchanged. Therefore, the final LCA value is the same, and hence the BMT root is also the same. The intermediate LCA value is different when δ1 or δ2 update the LCA first. However, in EP, the crash recovery observer does not expect a particular persist order for two persists in the same epoch. Furthermore, Invariant 2 assumes that the crash recovery observer will not read the transient persistent state between the two persists. For the latter case, δ1 and δ2 will update different parts of the LCA, hence the same proof holds.

The epoch boundary, however, places constraints on the degree of PLP, as it acts as point of ordering; all persists in the previous epoch must complete prior to any persist in a new epoch can complete. Thus, the higher the number of persists in an epoch, the higher is its potential PLP.

To handle OOO, the 2SP only needs minor modifications. When blocks belonging to persists from the same epoch are written back from the LLC, they are no longer locked in the WPQ. They are allowed to drain to persistent memory as they come. However, the WPQ retains enough state to monitor if the memory tuples of persists of the same epoch have all arrived at the WPQ or not. When they have all arrived, they are marked completed and the epoch is considered complete. On the other hand, blocks from the next future epoch are locked in the WPQ and marked incomplete, until the previous epoch has completed.

2) PLP Mechanism 3: BMT Update Coalescing: Further analysis of BMT updates within an EP model exposes a notable scenario that enables our final optimization. BMT updates within an epoch are likely to involve substantial number of common ancestor nodes, due to spatial locality. While OOO allows updates to BMT to be overlapped and performed out of order, there are still many updates to BMT nodes that occur. These updates can be considered superfluous considering that the same node may be updated multiple times by persists from the same epoch. In our final optimization, we seek to remove superfluous BMT updates by coalescing them.

Fig. 5 illustrates the update order of OOO persists with coalescing. Without coalescing, each persist incurs updating of four BMT nodes, causing a total of 12 updates. With coalescing, persists δ1 and δ2 updates are coalesced at their LCA (node X31), while δ3 is coalesced at the LCA at node X21. As a result, there are only seven updates to the BMT, which in this example corresponds to 42% reduction in BMT updates. Fewer updates to the BMT reduce the occupancy of the memory integrity verification engine, and hence reduces the latency and improves the throughput of the engine. Furthermore, an equally important benefit to coalescing is the number of writes. Without coalescing, the BMT root is updated three times: with
Coalescing, it is updated only once.

Coalescing’s effectiveness increases with spatial locality. Spatial locality results in nearby blocks being updated. In the best (and also frequent) case, blocks belonging to the same encryption page (a 4KB region) are updated within the epoch. They result in a single counter block being updated multiple times. Without coalescing, each such update generates BMT updates from leaf to root, while with coalescing, there is only one root update, thereby resulting in a substantial saving.

V. Architecture Design

In this section, we propose architecture designs to enable the PLP optimizations. As a baseline architecture, we assume a discrete counter cache [60], BMT cache (mcache) [4], [62], MAC cache [66], and persist-gathering WPQ [33]. These structures suffice if an unoptimized SP model is adhered to. To support our optimizations, additional structures are introduced, specifically schedulers, to retain the persist ordering. These schedulers will contain information that enforces BMT update order by allowing or preventing writes to occur. Each optimization has its own set of conditions for allowing or preventing writes, and will be analyzed next.

A. Strict Persistency: Pipelined BMT Updates

To support our first PLP technique, in-order pipelined BMT updates for SP, we introduce a new structure called persist tracking table (PTT) that enforces persist ordering in a SP model.

The PTT interacts with a scheduler that also interacts with the BMT cache and the MC / WPQ. Each entry in the PTT has multiple fields (Fig. 6). The field Lvl indicates the level of the BMT that the persist is currently updating, and is used to enforce in-order pipelining by staggering persists on different BMT levels. Fig. 6 shows an example of the PTT with four persist entries. \( \delta_1 \) is updating level 1 (node X1), while \( \delta_2 \) is updating level 2 (node X21), etc. The valid bit \( V \) is set when the entry is created and cleared when the persist has updated the BMT root. The ready bit \( R \) is set when updating the current BMT node has been completed, and cleared when the update moves on to the next node in the BMT update path. The PTT is managed as a circular buffer using a head and a tail pointer. The persist flag \( P \) is set when the BMT root has been updated and the entry can be removed: if the head pointer points to this entry (indicating this entry being the oldest) and the \( P \) bit is set, then BMT update is considered completed, and both the PTT entry and WPQ entry can be deallocated. The WPQptr field points to the corresponding persist entry in the WPQ. The PendingNode field indicates the ID/label of the node currently being updated.

In the figure, \( \delta_1 \) has finished updating the BMT root hence \( V = 0 \) and \( P = 1 \). \( \delta_2 \) and \( \delta_4 \) have updated their current nodes shown in the PendingNode fields, i.e., \( X21 \) for \( \delta_2 \) and \( X47 \) for \( \delta_4 \), hence \( R = 1 \). \( \delta_3 \)’s \( R \) bit is not set yet, either because the BMT node is not yet available for update (e.g. not found in the BMT cache/bing fetched from memory), or the update has not completed (e.g., MAC is still being calculated).

The role of the scheduler is to decide when a persist can proceed to updating the next BMT level. To illustrate the working of the scheduler, suppose a new persist request is encountered. An entry is created in the WPQ to hold the data, counter, and MAC to persist. Concurrently, a new PTT entry is also created (Step ①), initialized to point to the corresponding WPQ entry, with the PendingNode labeled with the appropriate leaf BMT node (i.e. MAC of counter block). The valid bit is set, while the ready and persist bits are reset. In Step ②, the BMT cache is looked up for the PendingNode. If found (BMT cache hit), a new MAC is calculated and the node updated. If not found (BMT cache miss), the node is fetched from memory, and the update commences after the node arrives from memory and is verified for integrity. Once the BMT node at the current level is updated, the \( R \) bit is set. For the scheduler to allow persist entries to move on to the next BMT levels, it waits until the \( R \) bits of these entries are set (Step ③).
indicating completion of updates to the current BMT levels. Once the bits are set, the scheduler wakes up the entries to move on to the next BMT levels. The PendingNode is input into the Next Node Logic to yield the ID for the next node to update (Step 4).

When the oldest entry (δ1) finishes updating the BMT root, the entry’s P bit is set and the WPQ is notified of BMT root update completion (Step 5). Afterward, the entry occupied by δ1 can be released, the head pointer updated, and execution continues. At the WPQ, if BMT root update completion notification is received, and other tuple items are completed (data, counter, and MAC), tuple items are marked as persisted and become releasable to memory.

B. Epoch Persistency: OOO BMT Updates

The previous PTT architecture is not capable of managing BMT updates with EP model with OOO updates of BMT nodes, as it enforces in-order pipelined updates. What is unique with EP is that there are two persist ordering policies: enforced ordering across epochs but not within an epoch. Thus, we split the PTT design into two tables: an epoch tracking table (ETT) to track epochs while relegating the PTT to only track persists. Furthermore, coalescing makes the PTT more sophisticated, as it must be able to calculate and track coalescing points of multiple persists. For these reasons, Fig. 7 shows the ETT/PTT split design and also the format of the PTT entries that enable OOO updates and coalescing.

An ETT is a circular buffer maintaining the order of active epochs. An ETT entry has the following fields: EID (epoch ID), a valid bit V, a ready bit R (which is set when updates of all persists in the epoch are completed), Lvl indicating the lowest BMT level being updated by the epoch, index to the start entry at the PTT (Start) and the end entry at the PTT (End). End is incremented (wrapped around on overflow) when a new persist from an epoch is encountered. Two special purpose registers are also added: GEC (global epoch counter) keeps track of the next epoch ID to allocate to a new epoch, while PEC (pending epoch counter) keeps track of the oldest active epoch being processed. In the PTT, each entry is added epoch ID (EID) field to identify the epoch a persist belongs to.

Fig. 7 illustrates the tables with an example. There are a total of five persists, with the first three persists from Epoch1, while the fourth and fifth persist are from Epoch2 and Epoch3, respectively. For example, the entry for Epoch1 at the ETT has Start = 0 and End = 2 to indicate that PTT indices 0..2 contain information of the persists of Epoch1. δ1, δ2, and δ3 are within the same epoch, and hence they perform OOO updates on the BMT root. In the example, δ3 has updated BMT root X1 (hence in the PTT, P = 1 and V = 0), while δ1 is working on updating BMT root X1 (hence in the PTT, P = 0 and V = 1). Since δ3 has persisted, its respective entry can be released from the WPQ assuming all components of the security tuple have been received. δ2, on the other hand, has not reached BMT level 1 but has finished updating BMT node X21 (hence in the PTT, R = 1). Since Epoch1 is still working on BMT level 2 node and it is the lowest level that any persist of Epoch1 is working on, in the ETT, Epoch1’s Lvl = 2. Epoch2 and Epoch3, consisting of one persist each, are updating different nodes (X33 and X47, respectively) at different BMT levels (level 3 and 4, respectively).

The figure illustrates that we exploit two types of parallelisms: epoch-level as well as persist-level parallelism. Within an epoch, we allow updates to occur OOO. Across epochs, we pipeline updates to the BMT in the epoch order using ETT to track and enforce correctness. The ETT mechanism for pipelining works similarly to the PTT mechanism for pipelining for SP, but with several modifications. First, the ready bit R of an epoch is set only when all its persists’ ready bits are also set. The Lvl of an epoch is determined as the maximum of Lvl field of all the persists of the epoch. With this, ETT can ensure that each BMT level can only be updated by persists of a single epoch, which avoids cross-epoch WAW hazards. When all persists of an epoch’s are completed within the level(s) that are recorded, an epoch’s R bit is set. When all epochs’ R bits are set, the epoch-level scheduler is invoked to advance the epochs to the next levels. If an epoch is at level 1 and its completed, the entry can then be deallocated.

Scheduling at the PTT is also modified. In SP, persists update the BMT in a pipelined lockstep fashion. With EP, the persist’s EID is used to check which level the persist is authorized to update. In the example in the figure, δ5 cannot advance to level 3 because Epoch3 is only authorized to update level 4 of the BMT. Apart from epoch-level restriction, each persist can advance to the next level independently of other persists. Hence, assuming the level is authorized, persist-level scheduler allows a persist to advance to the next level whenever R = 1 for the persist.

C. Epoch Persistency: Coalescing BMT

To coalesce updates within an epoch, we first need to find the common ancestors. We adopt a BMT node labeling scheme based on the previous work [16]. A unique label is assigned to each BMT node starting from 0 for the BMT root. To find
the parent of each BMT node, we subtract one from the label of current node and divided by the arity of the BMT to get the label of its parent. Then we can round this process down until the label 0 to get a list of all its ancestors. The least common ancestor (LCA) between two leaf nodes can be found from the longest prefix match between the two ancestor lists.

Next, we need to decide where to coalesce and how to determine which persists are coalesced together. Consider that it is likely that two persists from the same epoch will share many BMT nodes that are common. Coalescing can occur at any such node. However, the closer to leaf the common ancestor node is, the more effective coalescing becomes as more updates are eliminated. Therefore, an important principle for update coalescing is to coalesce at LCA whenever possible. The optimal coalescing occurs when the minimum number of updates is achieved. It requires each persist to be compared to every other persist in an epoch, and each pair that has the lowest LCA combined. Then, each combined pair is compared against every other BMT node or pair, and recombined, etc. However, this iterative approach is too costly for hardware implementation. Instead, we opt for paired coalescing, in which we always coalesced the new persist with previous one if it has not been coalesced with other persists.

D. Counter Tree Updates in Intel SGX

Intel SGX utilizes a “counter tree” to verify memory integrity. Similar to BMT, the counter tree does not cover data because it assumes a stateful MAC that protects against spoofing and splicing. The counter tree protects both the integrity and freshness of counters. However, unlike BMT, a counter tree requires the parent counter value to compute the MAC of child counters. As a result, to enable crash recovery, the parent counter value needs to be available and correct in order to compute the correct MAC value. On a store that persists, the tree’s entire path from leaf to root nodes must also be persisted, instead of just the tree root.

Therefore, two changes are needed for crash recovery correctness. First, Invariant 1 redefines a memory tuple as consisting of data ciphertext, counter, MAC, and all nodes of the counter tree from leaf to root along the update path. Consequently, Invariant 2 expands to include all nodes in the counter tree update path from leaf to root, in contrast to BMT which only requires the tree root to provide crash recovery. This leads to higher costs than BMT. For example, the number of updates that must persist for one store would scale by the height of the counter tree. To enable parallel updates while enforcing these two invariants, we may need to create a shadow copy of the counter tree to ensure atomicity of a single integrity tree update. Such restrictions due to the high inter-level dependence within an SGX Integrity Tree are yet to be explored. In this work, we focus only on BMT due to the extra cost incurred by the counter tree.

VI. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

Simulation Model  To evaluate our scheme, we built a cycle-accurate simulation model based on Gem5 [5]. Major parameters that we assume are listed in Table III.

For all schemes, to verify the integrity of a newly fetched data block, we let decryption and use of data be overlapped with integrity verification [30], [60], [62], [66]. If integrity verification fails, an exception is raised. Separate metadata caches for BMT, MAC, and counters are assumed (parameters in Table III). For strict persistency, we implemented write through caches to persist each store in order to the MC. For the pipelined BMT scheme, we rely on a PTT with 64 entries. To support OOO BMT updates and coalescing, we rely on a 2-entry ETT (i.e., only two concurrent epochs are allowed, while enforcing the order between them) and the 64-entry PTT is shared by the two epochs. An sfence operation is also emulated to demarcate epoch boundaries. For our coalescing out-of-order BMT update scheme, we assume an LCA coalescing where two adjacent updates to the BMT can be coalesced each time, with the leading store stopping at the LCA and delegating the root update to the trailing store.

In our sensitivity study, we vary the latency of the MAC computation (0–80 cycles), epoch size (4–256 stores), metadata cache size (32–256KB), and LLC sizes (1–4MB) to analyze their impacts. Cache latencies are 2 cycles (L1), 20 cycles (L2) and 30 cycles (L3) for their default configurations. The storage required by the PTT (Fig. 7) is as follows: each PTT entry has EID (6 bits), V, R and P (3 bits), Lvl (4 bits), WPQptr (32-bit), and PendingNode (32 bits), totalling 77 bits. For 64 entries, the total is 616B. For ETT, each entry has EID (6 bits), V and R (2 bits), Lvl (4 bits), and Start and End (two 6 bits), totalling 24 bits. A 2-entry ETT yields storage
Secure processor scheme with write-back caches and NVMM, which does not support any persistency model

Write-through metadata and data caches without invariant 2 (BMT root update ordering) enforced, similar to [4]

Strict persistence with sequential updates of BMT

Strict persistency with pipelined updates of BMT

Epoch persistency with out-of-order updates of BMT within an epoch, but in order across epochs

strict plus coalescing updates of BMT

overheads of 48 bits.

Benchmarks We use 15 representative benchmarks from SPEC2006 [21] to evaluate the proposed BMT write update models: astar, bwaves, cactusADM, gamess, gcc, gobmk, gromacs, h264ref, leslie3d, milc, namd, povray, sphinx3, tonto, and zeusmp. All benchmarks are fast forwarded to represent the regions and run with 100M instructions.

Evaluated Schemes The schemes we used for evaluation are shown in Table IV. For each scheme, we try two configurations. The first one is full memory protection, indicated with suffix "full", where the entire memory is assumed to be persistent and is protected. This is likely to be too pessimistic, because even in persistent memory applications, not all data needs to be persistent and supports crash recovery. The stack, for example, is only used for function parameters, local variables, and spills and refills of registers (especially acute in x86 ISA that has a limited number of general purpose registers), hence it is likely that it only needs memory encryption and integrity verification but without persistency support. Considering these factors, our default evaluation assumes the stack is not persistent, and covers only the heap and static/global region.

VII. Evaluation Results

Summary As expected, our best performing results come from OOO BMT updates with coalescing (coalescing), followed by OOO BMT updates without coalescing (o3), pipelined BMT updates (pipeline), and finally strict in order BMT updates (sp). The overheads compared to the baseline without any persistency (secure_WB) for all the schemes are: 720% (sp), 210% (pipeline), 20.7% (o3), and 20.2% (coalescing). Our best scheme reduces the overhead by 36× compared to the worst scheme, when protecting the entire memory minus the stack segment. Now, we analyze the performance in more details, starting from strict persistency to epoch persistency, followed by analyzing the performance overheads varying key design parameters.

Strict Persistency Here we compare results from sequential and pipelined BMT updates for strict persistency model, both for full memory protection as well as excluding the stack segment persistency (default).

Fig. 8 shows the execution time of strict persistency (sp), pipelined BMT updates (pipeline), and strict persistency with unenforced Invariant 2 (BMT updates ordering), similar to [4] (unordered) normalized to the secure_WB scheme where no persistency is utilized, i.e., no cache line flushes or persist barriers. We can make two observations. First, over the base of no persistency, SP incurs very high performance overheads, incurring a geometric average of 7.2× (30.7× for full memory). The majority of the overheads comes from the ordered BMT root updates. SP with unordered root updates significantly reduces such performance overhead but does not guarantee BMT verification success on crash recovery. Second, by pipelining BMT updates at different tree levels between persists, our pipeline scheme reduces the performance overhead of SP to 2.1× (6.9× for full-memory), representing speedup ratios of 3.4 (4.4 for full memory).

The key reason for high SP overheads is the high cost of each persist: each store must completely persist all crash recovery tuple, including updating the BMT root. With a MAC computation of 40 cycles and 9 BMT levels, it takes 360 cycles to update the BMT root. Applications that have high rate of stores perform worse than others.

Table V shows the number of persists in different schemes. In sp full and sp, the number of persists is the number of all stores and non-stack stores, respectively. For secure WB, the number of persist is the number of writebacks from the LLC. We can see that by persisting all stores non-stack, the persists per kilo instructions (PPKI) increase by more than two orders of magnitude (1.61 to 119.51, or to 32.6 for non-stack stores). Combined with the sequential leaf-to-root BMT updates, BMT updates become the dominant performance bottleneck. For example, with gamess having non-stack PPKI is 51.38 and 360 cycles to update BMT form leaf to root, we can estimate its IPC (instruction per cycle) as \( \frac{360}{51.38} = 0.053 \), which is very close to the actual IPC of 0.054. Since its IPC with secure_WB is 2.45, the slowdown is \( \frac{2.45}{0.053} = 45.3\times \), matching that shown in Fig. 8. For most benchmarks, the slowdown from sp correlates very well with the PPKI. Some benchmarks, such as leslie3d and bwaves, have high PPKIs but relatively much lower overheads than gamess. The reason is that their secure_WB model IPCs are low, due to the high number of dirty-block evictions from LLC.

To better understand the impact of MAC latency, in the next experiment, we vary the MAC latency from 0, 20, 40 to 80 cycles. We also simulate ideal meta-data caches (MDC) that can cache unlimited counters, MACs, and BMT nodes, never miss, and have a zero-cycle MAC computation latency. The results are shown in Fig. 9. From the figure, we can confirm that MAC computation is the key bottleneck of SP. MDC shows negligible performance overheads relatively, pointing out that persisting data and meta-data do not incur much overheads, as long as the MAC latencies involved in BMT.
Fig. 8. Execution time of SP schemes normalized to secure WB model. Scale is $\log_2$.

### TABLE V

The number of persists per kilo instructions (PPKI). The numbers in ‘SP_FULL’ and SECURE WB FULL’ include all stores while for others only non-stack stores.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Benchmark</th>
<th>sp_full (num stores)</th>
<th>secure WB _full (write backs)</th>
<th>sp (num stores, epoch stores)</th>
<th>$o_3$ (epoch stores)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>astar</td>
<td>83.48</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>13.21</td>
<td>1.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bwaves</td>
<td>100.27</td>
<td>8.70</td>
<td>61.60</td>
<td>26.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cactusADM</td>
<td>114.59</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>12.35</td>
<td>5.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>games</td>
<td>100.72</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>51.38</td>
<td>30.433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gcc</td>
<td>126.73</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>67.38</td>
<td>36.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gobmk</td>
<td>125.16</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>34.41</td>
<td>14.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gromacs</td>
<td>105.73</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>9.66</td>
<td>2.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h264ref</td>
<td>101.17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>48.80</td>
<td>10.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>leslie3d</td>
<td>108.79</td>
<td>7.78</td>
<td>58.47</td>
<td>17.58</td>
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<tr>
<td>milc</td>
<td>40.18</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13.65</td>
<td>4.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>namd</td>
<td>133.10</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>19.66</td>
<td>2.07</td>
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<tr>
<td>povray</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>39.23</td>
<td>11.22</td>
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<tr>
<td>sphinx3</td>
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<td>0.10</td>
<td>4.87</td>
<td>1.04</td>
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<tr>
<td>tonto</td>
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<td>34.45</td>
<td>16.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zeusmp</td>
<td>175.87</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>19.87</td>
<td>4.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>119.51</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>32.60</td>
<td>12.41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

leaf-to-root updates incur no cost.

**Epoch Persistence** We will now discuss results for epoch persistency model, shown in Fig. 10 (y-axes shown in linear scale). Two optimizations are enabled in this model: out of order BMT updates ($o_3$) and coalescing BMT updates (coalescing). The figure shows $o_3$ and coalescing achieve very low performance overheads: 20.7% and 20.2%, respectively ($2.42 \times$ and $2.35 \times$ for full memory, respectively), compared to the 720% with $sp$. The performance improvements come from two major sources: the overlapping of BMT updates, which reduces the critical path of BMT updates within an epoch, and the large reduction of persists when stores within an epoch fall into the same cache block. The latter can be seen in Table V in the last column. Compared to $SP_{o_3}$’s PPKI is roughly one third of $SP$‘s PPKI (12.41 vs. 32.6).

Fig. 9. Execution time of SP normalized to secure WB with different MAC latencies and ideal metadata caches.

Fig. 10 also shows that coalescing has limited impact on performance over $o_3$. The reason is that in order to coalesce updates, the older update would wait for the younger one to reach the LCA. Therefore, the saving that comes from coalescing is mainly due to the reduction of the number of updates to BMT nodes. Indeed, our experiments show that coalescing reduces BMT updates by 26.1% on average.

Another interesting observation from Fig. 10 is that in some cases (e.g. milc), our optimized epoch persistency model can match or even outperform secure WB. Digging deeper, the reason is that with secure WB, evicted dirty blocks perform BMT updates sequentially rather than pipelined or overlapped in our schemes.

**Impact of Epoch Size** Fig. 11 shows the impact of epoch size (in number of stores) in affecting persists per kilo instructions (PPKI). As expected, the larger the epoch, the more likely stores within a single epoch to fall into a single cache block that result in fewer persists, as the block is buffered in the cache until the end of the epoch before it is written back to main memory. Thus, naturally we would expect that the performance overheads of our scheme to monotonically decrease with the epoch size. This is true in general, but only up to some point, after which the opposite is observed. Fig. 12 shows
the execution time of coalescing with varying the epoch size, normalized to secure_WB. Upon deeper analysis, we found that while large epochs enable larger reduction in PPKI, small epochs smooth the write traffic to memory [28] hence reducing the queuing delay of persists in the MC and memory. This effect causes an epoch size of 256 to perform worse than 128 for some benchmarks (such as gamess, milc, and zeusmp).

**Fig. 11.** The number of persists per kilo instruction (PPKI) for different epoch sizes.

**Impact of Write Pending Queue Size** In our design, each entry in the WPQ holds a memory update (i.e., a store) until its entire memory tuple is ready to be persisted and the ordering requirement is met. As each store needs to update the BMT, the WPQ size determines how many BMT updates can be overlapped. With the strict persistency model, pipelined BMT updates overlap up to nine BMT updates since the BMT has nine levels. Therefore, a WPQ with 9 entries is sufficient. For epoch persistency model, our coalescing BMT schemes allows all stores in an epoch to update the BMT. Therefore, the WPQ size should correspond to the epoch size. We varied the WPQ size from 4 to 64 entries for our coalescing BMT model. WPQ sizes below 32 entries displayed increasing overhead, with a WPQ size of 4 showing 12% performance overhead compared to 32 entries. Fewer than 32 WPQ entries reduces performance by limiting the concurrency of BMT updates, but larger than 32 WPQ entries do not add performance improvement over 32 entries. Therefore, we use 32 as our default WPQ size.

**Fig. 12.** Execution time of our coalescing scheme with different epoch sizes, normalized to secure_WB.

**Impact of Metadata Cache and LLC Capacity** In this experiment, we vary all three metadata caches capacity from 32KB to 256KB. Our results indicate up to 2% performance difference across various sizes for any of our scheme.

We also vary the LLC capacity, from 4MB to 1MB. Our results indicate the performance overheads of coalescing BMT only vary modestly, from 20.2% to 22.8%, when the LLC capacity varies.

**VIII. CONCLUSIONS**

Memory integrity verification and encryption are essential for implementing secure computing systems. Atomically persisting integrity tree roots is responsible for the majority of the overhead incurred by updating security metadata. In this work, we presented three optimizations for atomically persisting NVM Bonsai Merkle Tree roots. With a strict persistency model, our proposed pipelined update mechanism showed an $3.4 \times$ performance improvement compared to sequential updates. With the epoch persistency model, our out-of-order root update and update coalescing mechanisms showed performance improvements of $5.99 \times$ over sequential updates. These optimizations significantly reduce the time required to update integrity tree roots and pave the way to make secure NVMM practical.

**REFERENCES**


